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SLEIGHT IS RIGHT: CYBER CONTROL AS A




Sleight of hand in manipulating the computation of results has become
the new might for deciding who wins presidential elections. It appears
that whoever controls the computation exercises a right to take advantage
and win, and whoever loses or relinquishes control of the computation
loses the election. As incumbents do not want to be identified with direct
interference or rigging, hacking has become an alternative means. This
raises a serious challenge for election management bodies (EMBs) and a
new frontier for international observation. As electronic data management
has become a key battleground, international observers cannot restrict
their monitoring to the manual process alone. However, individual states
may have data sensitivity concerns about granting electronic monitoring
access to partisan international observers. Institutionalizing internationally
agreed protocols that would allow real-time monitoring of EMBs’ com-
puter systems by international observers or forensic audits of any stage
of the electoral process to investigate interference, manipulation, hacking,
and counter claims, is now a necessity. At the same time, the extent to
which international monitors can be trusted to be non-partisan is of equal
importance and could reduce forum shopping over time.
Campaigning, vote-buying, and rigging all count towards winning
elections, which have become sophisticated and complicated over time.
We also note from Nazar Boyko and Erik Herron that the effects of
technical parties and partisan election management bodies (EMBs) on
voting outcomes have become a real and increasing threat to election
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administration.1 Thus, election management demands further measures
of scrutiny. The electoral process constituting the main tool for political
transitions across the globe has justifiably generated a heightened role
for international observers, alongside the unavoidable reality of foreign
influence. At the same time, academia has made clear that institutional
change in individual states is not driven entirely by local factors but also by
regional or international influences.2 Susan Hyde’s observation of increased
scholarly attention to international influences on democratization and the
role of international observers remains apt.3 Furthermore, Nicholas Kerr
and Anna Luhrmann have highlighted the importance of EMB autonomy
and media freedom, and their roles or significance in ensuring the integrity
and legitimacy of elections for the purposes of maintaining public trust.4
Douglas Anglin discussed African elections from the 1990s and the
participation of international observer teams, highlighting how their role
evolved over emerging political contexts and alongside periodic reap-
praisals for quality of service.5 We find ourselves at a new frontier whereby
developments relating to computer hacking pose a major challenge for
international monitors who do not as yet have the necessary electronic
access to monitor EMB data management processes. As opposition politics
have attained vigilance with manual voting processes and compilation of
results, incumbents have now resorted to hacking and interfering with EMB
central computer systems to ensure that the final results emerge as they
wish. This article draws attention to the fact that control over the electronic
aggregation process has become a new battleground and decider for who
wins an election.
The role of EMBs has always been under the spotlight.6 However, the
emerging pattern is that whoever has control of the rigging apparatus, in
this case the EMB’s computer systems, has the upper hand in winning the
election, and if unmonitored or unchecked, could win by sleight of hand.
The phenomenon poses a challenge for international observers and to what
extent they can exert influence on electronic data handling processes within
individual states.
International election monitors can provide an objective assessment
of the quality of elections; however, they carry their own biases, which
1. Nazar Boyko and Erik Herron, ‘The effects of technical parties and partisan election
management bodies (EMBs) on voting outcomes’, Electoral Studies 40 (2015), pp. 23–33.
2. Kristian Gleditsch and Michael Ward, ‘Diffusion and the international context of
democratization’, International Organization 60, 4 (2006), pp. 911–933.
3. Susan D. Hyde, ‘The observer effect in international politics: Evidence from a natural
experiment’, World Politics 60, 1 (2007), pp. 37–63.
4. Nicholas Kerr and Anna Luhrmann, ‘Public trust in manipulated elections: The role of
election administration and media freedom’, Electoral Studies 50 (2017), pp. 50–67.
5. Douglas G. Anglin, ‘International election monitoring: The African experience’, African
Affairs 97, 389 (1998), pp. 471–495.
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also have implications. They may at times endorse fraudulent elections,
a phenomenon which has fomented the rise of a shadow market: a supply
of lenient monitoring organizations or friendlier monitors. The wide array
of monitoring organizations facilitates forum shopping by incumbents to
pick and choose their preferred ones.7 As Judith Kelley points out, ‘no
organization is 100 percent credible all the time’8 nor has a perfect track
record, each with varying propensities to criticize elections. Moreover, they
are closely tied to states and are run by intergovernmental organizations, so
that ‘member states have a significant say in the organizations’ international
election monitoring activities’, as with the European Union (EU) for exam-
ple.9 Some intergovernmental organizations such as the Commonwealth of
Independent States, the African Union (AU), and the Commonwealth Sec-
retariat are less critical of elections than non-governmental organizations;
hence, it becomes harder for them to openly condemn fraudulent practices.
Therefore, ‘the notion that one could deploy monitors to just any election
and expect improvements is probably misguided’.10 As Svitlana Chernykh
and Milan Svolik point out, although third party actors such as electoral
commissions, courts, and local or international monitors play a mitigating
and counterbalancing role, the incumbent’s access to and monopoly of
electoral results—referred to as the incumbent’s informational advantage—
are a key political advantage. This advantage underpins rigging motivation
and endures the opposition’s probing and protest, a posture that even ‘limits
the credibility of the opposition’s threat to confront the incumbent in a post-
election protest’.11
The key issue, therefore, is what happens after the ballots have been cast,
in particular the vote aggregation process by the EMB’s computer systems
and the threat of hacking. Michael Callen and James Long examined
whether electoral ‘candidates exploit connections to elections officials to
add fraudulent votes during the aggregation process’.12 They note that in a
clean election, the photo quick count technique (explored in Afghanistan in
2010), which records the same vote totals both before and after aggregation,
ensures that the numbers are identical. Their study concluded that photo
quick count is even ‘cost-effective relative to traditional international elec-
tion monitoring’ and suggested institutional reforms to improve the effec-
7. Judith G. Kelley, Monitoring democracy: When international election observation works, and
why it often fails (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2012).
8. Kelley, Monitoring democracy, p. 158.
9. Ibid., p. 101.
10. Ibid., p. 99.
11. Svitlana Chernovykh and Milan Svolik, ‘Third-party actors and the success of democ-
racy: How electoral commissions, courts and observers shape incentives for electoral manip-
ulation and post-election protests’, Journal of Politics 77, 2 (2015), pp. 407–420.
12. Michael Callen and James D. Long, ‘Institutional corruption and election fraud:
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tiveness and sustainability of monitoring.13 This throws the ball straight into
the court of government institutions or EMBs to make this happen. Photo
quick count or its equivalent in other countries can prevent aggregation
fraud, but where it is banned, taken out of the equation, or interfered with
by a determined incumbent, how does one ensure that the truth prevails in
the end? To this end, a further study by Michael Callen and colleagues made
clear that ‘international observers seldom harness innovations in Informa-
tion and Communications Technology (ICT)’, and suggested that ‘ICT
intervention can improve electoral integrity in emerging democracies’.14
Hence, this article formulates a theoretical framework supported by case
studies to highlight the problem of the computational battleground. It
points out the necessity for ICT intervention that grants local and inter-
national monitors both de jure and de facto access to all EMB procedures. It
suggests adopting an international protocol or procedure that is actionable
by all countries or has global applicability, and which can be followed by
the international community should any state fall into a disputed election
that requires international intervention.
Political stakes, EMB models, and the potential for political interference
Where the political stakes have been very minimal, or where the playing
field was already so heavily tilted in favor of the incumbent that it was
obvious the incumbent was the winner even before the vote would be held
(e.g. Angola, Rwanda, Uganda, Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial
Guinea, and Sudan), the incumbent did not expend much effort over the
computation of results. In some cases such as Uganda, Cameroon, Congo-
Brazzaville, Gabon, and Gambia, the authorities shut down internet and
social media facilities in order to frustrate alternative means of compiling
the results in real time. However, where the stakes have been very high,
to the point of a tight two-horse race for example, and the playing fields
were almost level because each country was split into nearly equal halves
of incumbent versus opposition (e.g. Gabon, Ghana, and Kenya), there
were efforts at controlling the EMB’s computer systems in order to win
the election. These cases posed practical and policy challenges for the
international monitors. In Gambia, where both internet and international
monitors were banned and yet the incumbent failed to take control of
the EMB’s computer systems, the incumbent lost the election and had no
international back-up.
The International Institute of Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(IIDEA) has categorized three models in which EMBs can be designed to
13. Callen and Long, ‘Institutional corruption and election fraud’, p. 379.
14. Michael Callen, Clark Gibson, Danielle Jung and James D. Long, ‘Improving electoral
integrity with information and communications technology’, Journal of Experimental Political
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be independent, governmental, or mixed, whereby the EMB is independent
and autonomous from the executive branch of government, organized and
managed by the executive branch of government through a government
ministry, or a combination of the two models working in tandem.15 The
institutional design or model indicates the extent to which the incumbent
can go to exert influence on EMB operations and, therefore, contributes to
the likelihood of incumbent manipulation of the election results tabulation.
Sometimes the so-called autonomy of the EMB is not that independent
from political manipulation and control, particularly in high staked two-
horse race scenarios, and especially in winner-take-all political systems, as
highlighted by Kelley.16 Indeed Carolien van Ham and Staffan Lindberg
confirm that, where the institutions are controlled by authoritarian
incumbents, ‘the particular institutional design of EMBs should make
little difference’.17 Sarah Birch and Carolien van Ham have also noted that
de jure independence does ‘not always translate into de facto impartiality,
and electoral commissions can fall under the sway of incumbent political
forces’.18
This article, therefore, explores the theory that high-staked presidential
elections in winner-take-all political systems tend to generate enormous
potential or propensity for incumbent interference in EMB operations.
Incumbents would, therefore, seek the political advantage to influence a
winning or favorable result if not prevented, so that where the incumbent
has control of the EMB electronic aggregation process, the incumbent
could guarantee itself a win, or suffer a loss if the situation was to the
contrary. It does this through examining four case studies of presidential
elections: Gabon, Ghana, and the Gambia in 2016, and Kenya in 2017.
For each country case, the article examines the respective election
management processes, institutional design and conduct of their EMBs,
the election results, the hacking claims where alleged and role of interna-
tional observers where allowed, and the appraisal of Supreme Court and
Constitutional Court verdicts in the applicable circumstances. Statistical
data on election results were obtained from the official results published
by the electoral commissions of the respective countries or the relevant
government ministry as the case may be, supported by the author’s own
data analysis and credible media sources.
15. International IDEA, Electoral management design: The International IDEA handbook
revised edition (International IDEA, Stockholm, 2014), pp. 6–26.
16. Kelley, Monitoring democracy, p.142.
17. Carolien van Ham and Staffan Lindberg, ‘When guardians matter most: Exploring
the conditions under which electoral management body institutional design affects election
integrity’, Irish Political Studies 30, 4 (2015), p. 460.
18. Sarah Birch and Carolien van Ham, ‘Getting away with foul play? The importance of
formal and informal oversight institutions for electoral integrity’, European Journal of Political
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Table 1 Election results by candidate
Candidate Party Votes Percentage
Ali Bongo Ondimba Gabonese Democratic Party 177,722 49.80
Jean Ping UFC 172,128 48.23
Bruno Ben Moubamba Independent 1,896 0.53
Raymond Ndong Sima Independent 1,510 0.42
Pierre Claver Maganga
Mousavou
Social Democratic Party 1,130 0.32
Paul Mba Abessole National Woodcutters’ Rally –
Rally for Gabon
761 0.21
Gérard Ella Nguema Independent 583 0.16
Augustin Moussavou King Gabonese Socialist Party 553 0.15
Dieudonné Minlama Mintogo Independent 393 0.11
Abel Mbombe Nzoudou Independent 214 0.06
Invalid/blank votes 16,420 –
Total 373,310 100
Registered voters/turnout 627,805 59.46
Source: Gabonese Ministry of Interior.
Gabon’s presidential election of 2016
The 2016 Gabonese presidential elections were held on 27 August 2016,
in a vote where the winning candidate simply needed to poll the most votes
without an absolute majority required, hence only one round. The president
is elected for a seven-year term, and the incumbent Ali Bongo Ondimba
stood for a second term, having already done seven years from August 2009
when he first became president. His predecessor and father had been the
president of Gabon for 38 years. Of the ten candidates on the ballot paper,
the election became a two-horse race between Ali Bongo and Jean Ping, as
shown in Tables 1 and 2.
The IIDEA categorizes Gabon’s EMB design as mixed, where the
National Autonomous and Permanent Election Commission is supposed
to operate in tandem with the Ministry of Interior.19 The election is run by
the Commission, but the results are declared by the Ministry, as occurred
on 31 August 2016. The stakes were very high, especially as Gabon has
a winner-take-all political system, and so was the potential for incumbent
interference.20 For example, internet and social media were disabled during
the voting and counting, thereby preventing or frustrating any alterna-
tive real-time computation of results by opposition parties, international
monitors, civil society organizations, and social media platforms. Jean Ping
19. IIDEA, Electoral management design, p. 380.






/afraf/article-abstract/119/474/68/5573566 by guest on 17 July 2020
74 AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Table 2 Election results by province




Votes Percentage Votes Percentage
Estuaire 44,064 37.33 71,868 60.88
Haut-Ogooué 68,064 95.46 3,071 4.31
Moven-Ogooué 4,689 30.51 10,247 66.68
Ngounié 14,173 41.76 18,248 53.76
Nyanga 6,135 44.07 7,250 52.08
Ogooué-Ivindo 12,131 65.96 5,977 32.5
Ogooué-Lolo 9,713 53.25 8,193 44.65
Ogooué-Maritime 7,983 29.67 18,363 68.26
Woleu-Ntem 8,818 24.81 25,914 72.9
Overseas 1,952 37.38 3,047 58.35
Total 177,722 49.8 172,178 48.23
Source: Gabonese Ministry of Interior.
had already declared for himself a presumptive win by 59 percent against
38 percent for Bongo, based on statistics independently compiled by the
opposition Union of Forces for Change (UFC). However, the official results
declared by the Ministry of Interior gave a close margin of 49.8 percent
for Bongo and 48.23 percent for Ping. The Ping camp complained of foul
play, government hacking, and manipulation, but without any analytical
evidence to counter what they thought was spurious.
An obvious sign of institutional manipulation of the data emerged from
the result in Haut Ogooué province, Bongo’s native stronghold, where the
incumbent polled 68,064 votes or 95.46 percent of the ballot, as shown
in Table 2. Voter turnout is a recurring theme in academic debate, and
we note the analytical importance of voter turnout to election results,
observer guidance, and decision-making, as detailed by Mark Schelker and
Marco Schneiter.21 However, in all probability, even if we maximized voter
turnout by compulsory voting,22 it was practically impossible to achieve the
minimum 99.77 percent voter turnout by the wildest stretch of empirical
analysis23 or even by the most loyal voting habits24, which the Commission
claimed to underscore the 95.46 percent vote for Bongo in Haut Ogooué.
21. Mark Schelker and Marco Schneiter, ‘The elasticity of voter turnout: Investing 85 cents
per voter to increase voter turnout by 4 percent’, Electoral Studies 49 (2017), pp. 65–74.
22. Arend Lijphart, ‘Unequal participation: Democracy’s unresolved dilemma’, American
Political Science Review 91, 1 (1997), pp. 1–11.
23. Benny Geys, ‘Explaining voter turnout: A review of aggregate-level research’, Electoral
Studies 35, 4 (2006), pp. 637–663.
24. Maciej Gorecki, ‘Electoral context, habit-formation and voter turnout: A new analysis’,
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Hence, the Haut Ogooué result became a key standpoint from which to
question the integrity of the official data presented, especially as the national
voter turnout was as low as 59.46 percent (Table 1).
Jean Ping appealed against the result on 8 September 2016, and the
Constitutional Court convened to reassess the vote count. The court was
presided over by Marie-Madeleine Mborantsuo, the former mistress of
the first president Omar Bongo Ondimba,25 with whom she had three
children. In the recount process, the court revised the Haut Ogooué poll
to 83.2 percent and a voter turnout of 98 percent but also annulled the
votes of 21 polling stations in Librevillle that was Ping’s stronghold. The
final result of 50.66 percent for the incumbent and 47.24 percent for Ping
was announced surreptitiously at midnight on 23–24 September 2016.26
By this stage, the entire dynamics of the election management process27
had already undermined the perceptions of integrity,28 as was the view of
the EU Election Observer Mission (EOM) who had already announced
that the recount process conducted by the Constitutional Court lacked
transparency.29
The role of international observers has traditionally been restricted
to monitoring the manual electoral process, and observer teams are not
accorded electronic access to EMB computer systems. As no pre-existing
protocols or laws were in place to guarantee monitoring access to the
Commissions’s data management systems, the EU observers were denied
observation and electronic access to the recount process in order to investi-
gate properly and confirm the result. The EU EOM’s firm verdict was that
the court ‘failed to resolve anomalies’,30 and that the Gabonese intelligence
wire-tapped their conversations, with the observer mission chief being the
prime target.31 More importantly, the court notified that a physical recount
was impossible because the balloted papers had already been destroyed.
Therefore, in the absence of the hard evidence (the paper ballots), the
establishment quoted unsupportable and unverifiable computer data to
25. AllAfrica, ‘Gabon: AU will send observers to help with election appeal’, 15 September
2016, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201609150802.html> (22 January 2018).
26. Viral World News, ‘The constitutional court of Gabon upholds incumbent President Ali
Bongo’s election victory, rejects opposition’ 24 September 2016, <http://educationpingler.
blogspot.co.uk/2016/09/the-constitutional-court-of-gabon.html> (22 January 2018).
27. Richard Frank and Ferran Coma, ‘How election dynamics shape perceptions of electoral
integrity’, Electoral Studies 48 (2017), pp. 153–165.
28. Kerr and Luhrmann, ‘Public trust in manipulated elections’.
29. Abdur Shaban, ‘Gabon polls “lacked transparency”—EU observer mission’, AfricaNews,
29 August 2016, <http://www.africanews.com/2016/08/29/gabon-polls-lacked-transparency-
eu-observer-mission/> (22 January 2018).
30. Conor Gaffey, ‘EU observers blame Gabon court as Bongo victory upheld’, Newsweek,
26 September 2016, <http://www.newsweek.com/eu-observers-slam-gabon-court-bongo-re-
election-upheld-502757> (17 January 2018).
31. The Guardian, ‘EU observers wiretapped during Gabon vote’, 3 October 2016, <http://
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declare a winning result for the incumbent. The incumbent’s disabling of
internet and social media prevented alternative ways of accounting for the
tally in real time. In effect, the incumbent maintained control of the rigging
apparatus—the Commission’s computer systems—and ensured that the
establishment emerged victorious and remained in power.
Ghana’s presidential election of 2016
The 2016 Ghanaian presidential election resulted in a 53.72 percent win
for the opposition candidate Nana Akufo-Addo and 44.53 percent for the
incumbent president John Mahama,32 the first time that an incumbent
president of Ghana had failed to win at second term. The background
to this was the 2012 presidential election results that were challenged
in court,33 of which the Supreme Court pronounced a panel ruling of
5:4 in favor of the incumbent to uphold the result of 50.7 percent for
John Mahama and 47.74 percent for the opposition candidate Nana
Akufo-Addo.34 The main opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) had
learnt thorough lessons from the eight-month-long court case, and made
sure that all practical and procedural loopholes had been sealed in the
preparations towards the 2016 elections. What remained unpredictable
was the electronic transfer of results from polling stations to the Electoral
Commission and subsequent aggregation of votes on the Commission’s
computer servers. Ghana’s Electoral Commission has been classified by
IIDEA as an independent EMB.35 However, as the stakes were very high for
a two-horse race in a winner-take-all polity,36 the potential for incumbent
interference with the Commission’s independence was also high.
Elections in Ghana are eagerly monitored by local, subregional, regional,
and international observers across the globe, partly due to heightened
international interest in the country’s reputation as a beacon of democracy
on the African continent. The 2016 elections were swamped with interna-
tional observers, as was the case for the 2012 elections and the preceding
December 2008 elections, which incidentally occurred in the wake of
the disastrous December 2007 Kenyan elections and the March 2008
Zimbabwean elections, both of which resulted in violence and unworkable
power sharing agreements.37 Observer teams present at the 2016 general
32. Electoral Commission of Ghana, ‘2016 presidential results’, 12 December 2016,
<http://www.ec.gov.gh/election-results/2016-presidential-results.html> (17 January 2018).
33. Sarah Brierly and George Ofosu, ‘The presidential and parliamentary elections in
Ghana, December 2012’, Electoral Studies 35 (2014), pp. 382–385.
34. Paul Pryce and Raphael Oidtmann, ‘The 2012 general election in Ghana’, Electoral
Studies 34 (2014), pp. 330–334.
35. IIDEA, Electoral management design, p. 380.
36. Kelley, Monitoring democracy, p. 142.
37. Michael Amoah, ‘The most difficult decision yet: Ghana’s 2008 presidential elections’,
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elections included the Coalition of Domestic Elections Observers, the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) observer team,
the AU Observer Mission, EU EOM, and the Carter Center. Traditionally,
all political parties had representatives in the Electoral Commission’s com-
puter ‘strong room’ to verify votes as they trickled in, but not international
observers.38 Despite the amount of observation covering the electoral
process as a whole, there were anomalies in the 2012 election results that
could not be resolved in court, as the Supreme Court verdict had proved.
The NPP, therefore, sought the services of Joseph Anokye, a Ghanaian
geodetic engineer and technology manager who had worked with the US
National Aeronautics and Space Administration as a telecommunications
service manager. The party hired Joe Anokye for their own electoral data
management and communications purposes for the 2016 elections.39
Anokye set up a parallel system of collating countrywide election results
in real time, so that the NPP could compile alternative results as back-
up to the national grid, having learnt their lessons that they could not
rely on a court of politicized judges to adjudicate on evidence. The NPP
announced results of the 2016 elections in real time, which offset any
potential attempt by the Electoral Commission to announce something
else or use a computer virus attack as an excuse to cover up for potential
anomalies.
There was public discussion of a cyber war that occurred during the 2016
presidential election. It is alleged that there was government-sponsored
hacking or manipulation of the Electoral Commission’s data systems, and
then, the use of a neutralizing algorithm programed by a counter agent to
offset the doctoring of the election results.40 Neither of the political parties
admitted to hacking. The Commission complained publicly of hacking and
counter hacking, even though the website was restored within 24 hours.41
Confessions made by top officials at the Commission reveal that there
was more to the drama than was reported on the Commission’s website
38. Ghana News Agency, ‘EC’s “strong room” structure needs reviewing’, News Ghana,
21 September 2014, <https://www.newsghana.com.gh/ecs-strong-room-structure-needs-
reviewing/> (17 January 2018).
39. Enoch D. Frimpong, ‘How Joe Anokye helped NPP to tally election results ahead of
EC’, Graphic Online, 12 December 2016, <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/general-news/
how-joe-anokye-helped-npp-to-tally-election-results-ahead-of-ec.html> (31 January 2019).
40. Rockson Adofo, ‘Did NPP employ a NASA computer analyst to hack into the E.C.’s
computers?’ Modern Ghana News, 25 December 2016, <https://www.modernghana.com/
news/745346/did-npp-employ-a-nasa-computer-analyst-to-hack-into-the-ecs.html> (17
January 2018).
41. BBC News, ‘Ghana election commission website hit by attack’, 8 December 2016,
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38247987>(17January 2018); GhanaWeb,
‘Our figures changed when keyed into the system—EC’, 15 December 2016, <http://
ghanaelection2016.ghanaweb-news.com/2/post/2016/12/our-figures-changed-when-keyed-
into-the-system-ec.html>(17 January 2018); AllAfrica, ‘Ghana: Electoral commission
wards off cyber attack’, 15 December 2016, <http://aa.com.tr/en/africa/ghana-electoral-
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Table 3 Presidential election results by candidate
Candidate Votes Percentage Counties with minimum 25
percent of valid votes cast
John Aukot 27,311 0.18
Mohamed Dida 38,093 0.25
Shakhalaga Jirongo 11,705 0.08
Japheth Kaluyu 16,482 0.11
Uhuru Kenyatta 8,203,290 54.27 35
Michael Mwaura 13,257 0.09
Joseph Nyaga 42,259 0.28
Raila Odinga 6,762,224 44.74 29
Total valid votes 15,114,621 100
Source: Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission.
regarding the live cyber war. Whereas some analysts have opined that
Anokye prevented the elections from being rigged, his role in the saga
remains in the arena of public debate.42 International observers were not
in a position to access or verify the integrity of the Commission’s electronic
data, as there is no legislation for it. The Commission resorted to the
manual counting of paper ballots allowed within 72 hours of the vote.
Eventually, the incumbent president had to concede within the 72-hour
window, having realized that it would no longer be possible to do anything
about the real results. In sum, when the incumbent could not have utter
control of the rigging apparatus—the Commission’s computer servers and
database, the incumbent lost the election.
Kenya’s presidential election of 2017
The 2017 Kenyan general elections occurred on 8 August. The presidential
ballot was held under a two-round system, whereby failure of a leading
candidate to win more than 50 percent of the vote plus at least 25 percent
each in a minimum 24 out of the 47 counties, automatically generated a
second round. According to the Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission, Uhuru Kenyatta of the incumbent Jubilee Alliance polled
54.27 percent of the presidential vote, whereas Raila Odinga of the oppo-
sition National Super Alliance (NASA) polled 44.74 percent, as shown in
Table 3. There was high anticipation from both sides and an impressive
voter turnout of 77.5 percent, as shown in Table 4.
42. Sydney Casefly-Hayford, ‘The non-rigged election’, Modern Ghana News, 13 Decem-
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Table 4 Voter statistics of the 2017 Kenyan elections
National Tally Percentage
Total valid votes 15,114,621 77.07
Rejected ballots 81,685 0.42
Voter turnout 15,196,306 77.49
Absentees 4,415,117 22.51
Registered voters 19,611,423 100
Source: Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission.
Kenya’s Commission has been categorized by the IIDEA as an inde-
pendent EMB.43 However, Kenya also has a history of ethnic clashes
and post-election violence following the 2007 presidential election in the
context of the winner-take-all political system.44 It was, therefore, not
unexpected when the losing candidate refused to accept the results and
alleged voting irregularities, particularly hacking by state agents both within
the Commission and outside of it. Odinga appealed to the Kenyan Supreme
Court to investigate. It should be noted, that one week before the vote, the
top official at the Commission in charge of the computerization of results
was tortured for his password to the EMB’s data management system and
murdered.45 On 1 September, the Kenyan Supreme Court nullified the
election results after unearthing, among other things, 3,395 failed login
attempts and 3,851 successful login attempts on the Commission’s servers,
including from unidentified strangers.46 This was the first time in African
politics that a court had nullified the electoral result of an incumbent’s win.
The court ordered a repeat election within 60 days, which occurred on 26
October, but by which time other issues, including insufficient time for the
printing of revised ballot papers and the invocation of a fresh nominations
process to involve the original candidates or even new ones, had led the
opposition candidate to withdraw from the race. Uhuru Kenyatta was
declared the automatic winner of the repeat vote that took place.
There were high-profile international observer teams in Kenya, from
the AU, East African Community, the EU EOM, Carter Center, and the
Commonwealth Observer Group. Academics and policy makers noted that
international observer missions present in Kenya, with the exception of
43. IIDEA, Electoral management design, p. 382.
44. Kelley, Monitoring democracy, p. 142.
45. BBC News, ‘Kenyan election official Chris Msando “tortured to death”’, 2 August 2017,
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-40807425> (17 January 2018).
46. Kenya Today, ‘Report by ICT experts appointed by Supreme Court on IEBC server and
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the AU team which did not want to be implicated, made vociferous media
representations that the entire electoral process was free and fair even when
there was stark evidence of falsified statistics coming from the Commis-
sion’s computers, including email attachments with unsigned forms.47 The
rubber-stamping announcements from international observers indicated
their support for the incumbent, which showed when the Supreme Court
nullified the vote and publicized the evidence.48 It became an open question
that if the most elitist international observer teams were at the scene and
could not get it right, then the future of public trust in international
observation as a means of legitimation was at stake.49
The evidence unearthed by the Supreme Court was quite damning. Ben-
efiting from the forensic analyses led by University of Michigan Professor
of Statistics and Political Science Walter Mebane,50 the court examined
41,451 forms 34A, 291 forms 34B, and one form 34C that represented
all three stages of vote collection, and found out that 10,438 forms 34A
were missing when the winning result was declared. Among the forms
34B, 10 were illegible, 236 had no watermark, and 56 did not bear the
security feature.51 The account of the Commission’s chairperson had 9,945
transaction logs from an internet provider address that was not one of the
Commission partner addresses. Among the strangers who hacked into the
Commission were vendors and anonymous users with gmail accounts.52
The court verdict did not encounter any opposition, and the incumbent
had to accept it. In the Kenyan case, when the rigging apparatus (the
Commission’s computer systems) came under the adjudication of the
Kenyan Supreme Court, the incumbent lost the verdict.
Following the Supreme Court verdict, there were widespread and over-
whelming calls for reform, including the printing of revised ballot papers.
However, these reforms could not take place before the repeat election
within 60 days, which rather defeated the point of the Supreme Court
verdict, in that the country headed straight into the repeat election without
reform and the ballot papers unrevised. The opposition NASA candidate
threatened a tactical boycott of the repeat election with the hope that
47. Nic Cheeseman, Todd Moss and Jeffrey Smith, ‘It’s time for international election
monitors to do their job’, The Washington Post, 15 November 2017, <https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/democracy-post/wp/2017/11/15/its-time-for-international-
election-monitors-to-start-doing-their-job/?utm_term=.dec41e447663> (22 January 2018).
48. Helen Epstein, ‘Kenya: The election and the cover-up’, The New York Review of
Books, 30 August 2017, <http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/08/30/kenya-the-election-and-
the-cover-up/> (20 January 2018),
49. Kerr and Luhrmann, ‘Public trust in manipulated elections’.
50. Epstein, ‘Kenya’.
51. Kamau Muthoni and Paul Ogemba, ‘Presidential petition: What scrutiny
of key IEBC forms revealed’, Standard Digital, 31 August 2017, <https://www.
standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001253102/presidential-petition-what-scrutiny-of-key-iebc-
forms-revealed\protect$\relax>$ (31 January 2019).
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it would generate a fresh nominations process to include the original
candidates instead of the top two, but this was not guaranteed either. In
the absence of the proposed reforms or fresh nominations, the point had
already been established that the repeat election was automatically rigged
in advance.
Fears of facing a similar scenario whereby the repeat rigging could
be challenged in court once more moved the ruling party to take steps
to eliminate avenues that could lead to a second court challenge. The
government initiated moves in five ways: (i) to undermine the Commission
chairperson’s status by amending the criteria for their replacement; (ii) to
reduce the quorum for the Commission’s conduct of business from 5 to
3 and make the panel easier to manipulate; (iii) to delegitimize electronic
results so that they had no legal or binding status; (iv) to eliminate the
Supreme Court’s right to investigate and void an election, and (v) to make
sure the withdrawal of an opposition candidate signalled their official exit
from the race with no option to generate a fresh nominations process. On 22
September 2017, the majority party in parliament sponsored the proposed
amendments and pushed the legislation through before the repeat election
took place. The practical nuances of the proposals are hereby explained.
The amendment to the Commission chairperson’s replacement proce-
dure took the following form. Previously, article 250(2) of the existing
Kenyan constitution53 had set out the operational distinction between the
chairperson and the other commissioners so that Article 250(10) then
provided for a vice chair to replace the chairperson as and when necessary.
The proposed amendment stipulated that any member of the commission
could be elected from among the commissioners to act as chairperson
and exercise the respective powers and responsibilities whenever the chair
was no more, thereby setting the scene for any chair who disagreed with
the government’s agenda to be easily moved aside and replaced with a
government lackey. The amendment to the Commission’s original quorum
stipulated in Schedule 2(5) of the Independent Electoral and Boundaries
Commission Act 2011 occurred in order to make it easier to push through
specific agendas so that the Commission board did not need too many com-
missioners to carry out moves required by the incumbent, in anticipation
of a court challenge.54
The amendment to relegate electronically transmitted results to a non-
binding status took shape as follows. Article 86(b) of the 2010 constitution
required that election results be announced by the presiding officer at each
polling station and then transmitted, in order to fulfill Article 86(a) of the
53. National Council for Law Reporting, The constitution of Kenya, 2010, 27 August 2010.
54. National Council for Law Reporting, The Independent and Electoral Boundaries Commis-
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constitution that the result should be accurate, verifiable, accountable, and
transparent. The proposed amendment stated that:
Where there is a discrepancy between the electronically transmitted and
manually transmitted results, the manually transmitted results shall prevail.
Any failure to transmit or publish the election results in an electronic format
shall not invalidate the result as announced and declared by the respective
presiding and returning officers at the polling station and constituency
tallying center, respectively. The Commission shall, to facilitate public
information, establish a mechanism for the live-streaming of results as
announced at polling stations, and the results so streamed shall be for
purposes of public information only and shall not be the basis for a
declaration by the Commission.55
The amendment was aimed to deny the original tally that would be
streamed from the polling station their due right of equal status to be
declared by the Commission as the result, and effectively undermined
Article 86(a). Electronically transmitted results, therefore, lost their due
relevance. Mitigating submissions made by the Institute for Social Account-
ability stated:
The elections should be managed that there are no discrepancies between
the manual and the electronic results. The house should not legislate to
legitimize irregularities in the transmission of results. To say if technology
fails the manual system supersedes is just to say that the election is manual
. . . These amendments completely destroy the threshold provided by
Article 86(a) (that the voting system should be accurate, verifiable, secure,
accountable, and transparent) and achieved in the Elections Act 2011 as
amended by the 11th Parliament.56
The government proposals also tampered with Article 83 of the Kenyan
Elections Act 2011 by amending the premise for the voiding of election
results and the provision for the Supreme Court to adjudicate the results
as valid or nullified.57 In effect, not only would the proposals stop the
court from invalidating results declared by the Commission if the electronic
process failed to work smoothly, but would also prevent the court from
voiding an election on the grounds of non-compliance with the law,
provided the poll was held in line with the broad constitutional principles,
and that any “non-compliance” did not affect the general trajectory of the
result of the election.
Finally, the amendment on electoral candidate boycott took place in
the following context. As it became quite clear that 60 days would not
55. Mzalendo, ‘The Election Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2017’, 3 October 2017, <https://
dokeza.mzalendo.com/bills/election-laws-amendment-bill-2017/> (22 January 2018).
56. The Institute for Social Accountability (TISA), ‘Memorandum on the Election Laws
(Amendment) Bill 2017’ (TISA, Nairobi, 2017).
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be sufficient to implement the long list of wide-ranging reforms sought by
the opposition, the opposition leader Raila Odinga threatened to withdraw
from the race altogether, so as to trigger a fresh nominations process. In
order to undermine any attempt by the opposition to stretch the reform
process beyond the 60 days limit for a repeat election provided for in
Article 140(3), after which period there was potential for the Speaker of the
National Assembly to assume the presidency and preside over the election
as provided in Article 146(2)(b), the government legislative proposals
included the following wording:
The Commission shall not conduct fresh nominations for a fresh election
pursuant to Article 140(3) of the Constitution. An eligible candidate for
an election pursuant to Article 140(3) of the Constitution may with-
draw from the election by notice in writing to the Commission, and—
where there are more than two remaining candidates in the election after
the withdrawal, the election shall proceed as scheduled; where only one
candidate remains after the withdrawal, the remaining candidate shall be
declared elected forthwith as the President-elect without any election being
held.58
Eventually, Odinga withdrew from the race, verbally but not in writing,
leaving citizens to vote for the incumbent Uhuru Kenyatta, who was
subsequently declared the winner of a ballot.
In sum, even the rare opportunity that existed for a Kenyan Supreme
Court to nullify the cyber rigging machine was eliminated when the
incumbent engaged its parliamentary majority to change the electoral
laws overnight. It must also be noted that Joe Anokye, the Ghanaian the
cyber technologist who set up a parallel vote collating system for the
2016 Ghanaian elections, was invited by the Kenyan opposition NASA
coalition for a similar assignment in Kenya but was deported at the
airport.59 Also by sheer coincidence, the Ghanaian incumbent president
who lost the 2016 Ghanaian election to Joe Anokye’s vigilance happened
to be leading the Commonwealth Observer Group in the 2017 Kenyan
elections.
The Gambia’s presidential election of 2016
The Gambian 2016 general elections occurred on 1 December. The
original results released by the Independent Electoral Commission and
58. Mzalendo, ‘The Election Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2017’.
59. Abu Mubarik, ‘How Mac Manu was prevented from entering Kenya’, Pulse, 6 August
2017, <http://www.pulse.com.gh/news/former-npp-campaign-chairman-how-mac-manu-
was-prevented-from-entering-kenya-id7102659.html > (17 January 2018); Ghana News
Online, ‘Director general of NCA Joe Anokye also deported from Kenya’, 9 August 2017,
<http://ghananewsonline.com.gh/director-general-nca-joe-anokye-also-deported-kenya/
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Table 5 The original election results by candidate
Candidate Votes Percentage
Adama Barrow 263,515 45.5
Yahya Jammeh 212,099 36.7
Mama Kandeh 102,969 17.8
Total 578,583 100
Source: BBC and Al Jazeera English.
published the next day by both the BBC and Al Jazeera English are
shown in Table 5.60 The incumbent Yahya Jammeh conceded by a public
announcement and promised a smooth handover. Subsequent to Jammeh’s
concession, the Commission admitted a serious and inadvertent error,
and organized a press conference to announce a revised result, which
sparked controversy and a retraction of the incumbent’s concession
followed by a forthright demand for a full investigation. Gambia’s
Commission has been classified by the IIDEA as an independent
EMB.61
The original results that were announced and captured by the BBC and
Al Jazeera disappeared from the Commission’s website, but they remained
on the BBC and Al Jazeera websites. Only the revised results and the
accompanying press release to explain the anomaly or tabulation errors
appear on the Commission’s website.62 The Commission press release cited
the alleged errors and postulated a correcting procedure to rectify the
errors.
It is not difficult to decipher the error committed by the Commission’s
data staff. One simply has to follow the Commission’s press statement
and work out if the explanation holds or not. Adama Barrow originally
polled 263,515 nationally (Table 5); he also polled 28,102 in Basse, and
the voter turnout or total votes cast in Basse was 63,909 according to data
still downloadable from the Commission’s download center.63 When you
apply the Commission’s press release explanation and the alleged correcting
procedure to these figures, you arrive at the 227,708 which the Commission
announced as the final result for Barrow, for which reason we know the
60. BBC News, ‘Gambia’s Jammeh loses to Adama Barrow in shock election result’, 2
December 2016, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-38183906> (17 January 2018);
Al Jazeera English, ‘Yahya Jammeh loses to Adama Barrow in Gambia election’, 2 Decem-
ber 2016, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/12/gambia-yahya-jammeh-loses-election-
adama-barrow-161202130519550.html> (17 January 2018).
61. IIDEA, Electoral management design, p. 380.
62. Independent Electoral Commission—The Gambia, ‘The total of final election results’.
63. Independent Electoral Commission—The Gambia, ‘Download’, <http://iec.gm/index.php/
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Table 6 The revised election results by candidate—final announcement
Candidate Party Votes
Adama Barrow Coalition 2016 227,708
Yahya Jammeh Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and
Reconstruction
208,487
Mama Kandeh Gambia Democratic Congress 89,768
Total 525,963
Registered voters 886,578
Source: Independent Electoral Commission—The Gambia69.
Independent Electoral Commission—The Gambia, ‘The total of final election results by
Alieu Momarr Njai—chairman IEC’, <http://iec.gm/the-total-of-final-election-results/> (5
December 2016).
formula to be:
(Original Result −−Total Turnout in Basse) + Candidate Votes in Basse
= Revised Result.
Barrow: (263, 515 −−63, 909) + 28, 102 = 227, 708.
The Commission claims that the error was repeated across for all three
candidates; hence, the alleged correcting procedure should also apply to all
three candidates. We know that Yahya Jammeh originally polled 212,099
nationally; he also polled 24,490 in Basse, and the voter turnout in Basse
was 63,909. We also know that the third candidate Kandeh originally polled
102, 969 nationally, 11,289 in Basse, and the voter turnout in Basse was
63,909.64 But when we apply the Commission’s explanation to the sums
polled by the other two candidates, we do not arrive at the revised figures
announced as the final results as shown in Table 6 and 7. Instead, we obtain
the following different results, as also shown in Table 8:
Jammeh : (212, 099 −−63, 909) + 24, 490 = 172, 680, and
Kandeh : (102, 969 −−63, 909) + 11, 289 = 50, 349.
64. Ibid.
69. Independent Electoral Commission—The Gambia, ‘The total of final election results by
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Votes Votes Votes Voter Turnout/Votes
Cast (inc invalid)
Basse 28,102 24,490 11,289 63,909
Source: Independent Electoral Commission—The Gambia.
Table 8 Expected votes versus Commission-announced votes by candidate
Candidate Expected votes by following
correcting formula
Final votes announced by the
Commission
Yahya Jammeh 172,680 208,487
Mama Kandeh 50,349 89,768
Adama Barrow 227,708 227,708
We can only conclude that the error correcting procedure allegedly
applied to Barrow’s votes was not simultaneously applied to Jammeh’s or
Kandeh’s votes. Other independent analytical attempts, for example by
Samudeen Sarr,65 to analyse the Commission’s revised results encountered
a similar problem trying to follow the Commission’s correcting formula.
The Commission seems to have concocted a fictitious explanation to
compound already fictitious results. In effect, the Commission announced
a final set of falsified results, and we may never know the precise tabulation
errors that occurred originally.
Incumbent President Jammeh had a dictatorial record, and many were
relieved to hear the rare concession announcement to hand over the
presidency to the winner Adama Barrow. Gambia’s was a rare case in Africa
where the incumbent acted in good faith by not covertly or overtly inter-
fering with the Commission’s computer systems and promptly conceded
defeat. It is, therefore, unfortunate that the Commission made blatant
and unprofessional errors, even where it appeared that the incumbent had
lost the election anyway. The Commission chair’s attempt to make up
for, or cover up for the original anomalies, resulted in further anomalies.
It is equally unprofessional that the wrong result announced after the
Commission’s error correcting process was unanimously endorsed by the
65. Samudeen Sarr, ‘President Jammeh & APRC call for reelection’, The Gambia Eco, 8
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representatives of the contesting candidates at the Election House on 5
December 2016, as stated on the Commission’s webpage.66
It was within Jammeh’s constitutional right under Article 49 of the
constitution to challenge the results.67 However, the subregional political
pressure for him to quit was too much to allow for the many months
that it would take for the Gambian Supreme Court to convene. Under
Jammeh’s intimidating bad governance, the court was in disarray as at
December 2016 with fewer justices than the quorum to convene, and
it would take several months to advertize and recruit to form a panel.
The earliest the court could sit was May 2017; whereas, the international
pressure for Jammeh to quit had peaked as early as January 2017 when
ECOWAS forces massed troops at the Gambian border with Senegal
ready to invade if Jammeh did not concede.68 The bad governance under
Jammeh’s watch and the insufficient commitment to building key judicial
institutions cost him dearly when he really needed a court to sit over
his own matter. A ready court jurisdiction over the matter might have
exposed the data anomalies. Moreover, as he had disallowed international
observers, there was no other credible, independent, and alternative agency
to account for the gross tabulation errors committed by the Commission.
Jammeh’s pre-planned avoidance of international observers could be linked
to the pre-meditated plan to cut off internet provision and social media
facilitation, which then prevented the much-needed means to facilitate real-
time and alternative vote aggregation by other agencies. It appeared that
the incumbent undermined the very processes that could have guaranteed
broader accountability.
Conclusion
Of the four case studies, Ghana, Kenya, and the Gambia have independent
EMBs; whereas, Gabon has a mixed institutional design with the electoral
commission and interior ministry acting in tandem. The winner-take-all
political system for all four countries raised the political stakes for their
presidential candidates and the potential for incumbent hacking or other
interference in the electronic computation of results, particularly as there
were two-horse races in all four cases. Hence, internet and social media were
disabled in Gabon and Gambia to prevent or frustrate alternative real-time
computation of results by opposition parties, international monitors, civil
society organizations, and social media platforms. The incumbent in Gabon
66. Independent Electoral Commission—The Gambia, ‘The total of final election results’.
67. Constitute Project, ‘Gambia (The)‘s constitution of 1996 with amendments through
2004’,<https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Gambia_2004.pdf?lang=en> (20 Jan-
uary 2018).
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benefited from the internet blackout, whereas the incumbent in Gambia
denied others the facility when he might have benefited from it. Ghana
and Kenya which allowed internet and social media facilitation experienced
the real-time computation of electoral results by all parties concerned and
which contributed to countering and exposing hacking or electronic rigging
behaviors.
The Gabon case shows that the incumbent won the election when it
maintained sole and absolute control of the electronic computation of data.
This was not the case in Ghana where the electoral commission lost the
control of the electronic process to hacking and counter-hacking and had
to rely on paper ballots; Kenya where the Supreme Court constitutionally
authorized an electronic investigation and nullified the first official result;
and Gambia where the incumbent allowed the electoral commission full
control of the aggregation of results without interfering. This substantiates
the claim that a win is almost certain where the incumbent has control of
the data aggregation process and vice versa.
We appear to be at a new frontier where the rules of engagement need to
be reviewed, so that both local and international monitors would have de jure
and de facto access to all EMB procedures. One solution is to establish and
institutionalize internationally agreed ICT protocols that would allow real-
time electronic monitoring access to EMB data management processes,
and to which countries can sign up, so that independent election monitors
could conduct forensic audits to investigate hacking claims and counter
claims. Otherwise when a country gets stuck in an electoral dispute, there
would be no agreed norms or template for the international community to
follow even if that state would like international intervention. However, the
existence of an internationally agreed protocol would create foreign policy
opportunities for any individual state to benefit from potential international
arrangements and expertise hitherto considered as barred politically.
There are also a wide variety of practical dilemmas ahead for any
country. For example, come to the next Kenyan presidential election,
observer missions must consider whether the legislation in place would
guarantee a justifiable playing field, and whether there is room for political
accountability to a court, or else observers would be going to operate in
a climate where the existing legislation has already guaranteed another
rigging to take place. International monitors would also need to negotiate
data access protocols to allow real-time monitoring of the data management
systems of Kenya’s electoral commission. Otherwise, the establishment can
bully the process as happened in Gabon, and observers cannot vouch for the
integrity of EMB electronic data as happened in Ghana. Moreover, the non-
partisan integrity of international monitors would be in high demand. On
the one hand, the role of international observers has become the norm, and
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individual states would be debating to what extent potentially partisan
foreigners should have access to the electronic data management of their
elections.
Establishing the ICT protocols is not an impossible task. It is do-able,
objective, and verifiable, and can be institutionalized across international
boundaries. If everyone is following the agreed forensic audit procedures,
all parties will be on the same page with the aggregation process. Further-
more, following internationally agreed ICT protocols could impact on the
lingering issue of partisan international observers and reduce elements of
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